Journal of the Plague Years

Poster of May, 1968

• National Identity Scheme - Delivery Strategy
• Propaganda for the databases.
• Right in principle, wrong in detail.
• You Have To Laugh. Or Something.
• More Data Loss. Nothing To Worry About.
• Promiscuous Data-Management.
• "A Serious Renewed Debate" on ID Cards
• Blunkett: Robespierre is Alive and Well.
• Comments Received: Most People Just Forget:
• By the way... (re the missing discs)
• Letters to an Editor:

National Identity Scheme - Delivery Strategy

27 February 2008 .

The following is a paragraph from a British Home Office document describing methods of coercion to get the national ID card scheme adopted.

This document (probably dating from late 2007) was published by Wikileaks, with the following notes:

Unless otherwise specified the document described here:
* Was first publicly revealed by Wikileaks
* At that time was classified, confidential, censored or otherwise withheld from the public.
* Is of substantial political, diplomatic or ethical significance.
* Has been verified if the analysis, summary or note fields indicate, otherwise has not (yet) been verified. Most documents come in from journalists. Frauds are extremely rare, but possible.

I strongly doubt that this document, originating via NO2ID, is such a fraud.

The document, with all notes, can be found on the Wikileaks website at: https://wikileaks.be/wiki/National_Identity_Scheme_Options_Analysis_Outcome

A PDF of the document added on this website (28 Feb):
http://www.plagueyear.com/nis-options-analysis-outcome.pdf

The following is a note contributed by the person who submitted the document:

UK campaigners NO2ID this morning (29 January last) enlisted the help of bloggers across the world to spread a leaked government document describing how the British government intends to go about "coercing" its citizens onto a National Identity Register. The 'ID card' is revealed as little more than a cover to create a official dossier and trackable ID for every UK resident - creating what NO2ID calls 'the database state'.

NO2ID's national coordinator, Phil Booth, exhorted bloggers, freedom lovers and anyone who gives a damn about personal privacy to mirror the annotated document on their site.

"The charade is over. While ministers try to bamboozle the British public with fairytales about fingerprints, officials are plotting how to dupe and bully the population into surrendering control of their own identities.

"Biometric ID cards are a sham; a magician's flourish to cover the biggest identity fraud there has ever been."

NO2ID is the major protesting group against ID cards, and can be visited on http://no2id.net

I'm normally interested in commenting (where I might have something to say) rather than in reporting (where I usually don't). On a website which is concerned with a citizen's personal observation and opinion, this is the first promotion I've posted: I've done so because it's so fundamental to my ID-card hobby-horse.. The document referred to is best seen as a snapshot of Home Office thinking (probably towards the end of 2007) along the way to ensuring large-scale take up of ID cards. It makes chilling reading. Please go and read it and the annotations which have been added to it. Come back here soon!

Added 07 March 2008: Home Secretary Jacqui Smith's rather contorted announcements this week are wholly in line with the thinking outlined in the document.

'National Identity Scheme' 'Jacqui Smith' wikileaks NO2ID

Propaganda for the databases.

25 February 2008 .

There were two forceful messages last week, one in the real world and one in a TV drama, prosyletising in favour of the national DNA database and ID cards.

The Suffolk killer was apparently identified as Steve Wright by a match with DNA found on victims; his record on the national database resulted from a minor offence some years ago. A police spokesman claimed that it proved the need for a universal database in identifying felons.

In 'Waterloo Road', a sub-soap on BBC, there was a thread about a vulnerable teenaged girl seduced by a supply teacher who was in fact a paedophile working under false pretences. When a record and photo of this teacher arrived (after he'd disappeared with the girl), it turned out that he was an imposter. A policeman told the headteacher that the events wouldn't have happened if there had been a proper ID system in place.

Both messages seem very persuasive, almost unanswerable, at first glance. In fact they're both very overstated.

Steve Wright murdered five girls, that we know of, before he was caught, despite the fact that his DNA was on record. It now turns out that he may have been responsible for more killings previously. More to the point, he was known to be violent towards women a long time ago, and the police had been involved on several occasions. There is no doubt that a DNA database can be helpful, but this man should have been caught as soon or sooner by effective policing, good lines of communication and most of all (it's been suggested) by abandoning the attitude that domestic violence - which was how the police seem to have categorised the earlier violence - is some private matter with no bearing on the outside world.

As for the imposter in the TV drama; the procedures already in place work perfectly well if they're correctly followed (and in real life, that's now one thing that people in education are very careful about).

One of the problems with systems is that they fail sometimes. That will certainly be as true if the new universal surveillance systems are put in place, and possibly more so as they entice us to rely on them more and more while at the same time they become increasingly complex. And one of the problems with overstated arguments is that they rush us into decisions which we may later regret.

'DNA database' 'ID Card'

Right in principle, wrong in detail.

24 January 2008 .

In You Have To Laugh. Or Something, 20 January 2008, I wrote: "One thing I'm certain of: by choice, I'd have no part of an ID scheme - I'd go to nick rather than volunteer any more of my details to this mob. But of course, they'll do it by the back door - data collection before I can have a passport, or see a doctor, or send my kid to school, or travel on public transport. Not to put too fine a point on it, we're all s****d".

Just half a week has passed and a leaked document has revealed government intentions: they will issue ID cards to students. Without the cards, the student will be unable to open bank accounts, access loans or in all likelihood register for courses or buy a drink. At best - its repellent best - it's stealth, but more likely it will be the shambles of the sort we've been seeing in all matters connected with data collection, retention and protection by this government. And it's pin-pointing the young, which is abhorrent to me and, I suspect, to many law-abiding folk. So, in principle, my prediction was correct: in detail, I should have guessed they'd target kids first.

Memo to The Great Helmsman: the ID card is a dead duck; you have failed to demonstrate any competence in your IT programmes and you've destroyed confidence in your ability to secure the data you have - in a breath-takingly, relentlessly endless saga. Give it up. Get your act together on what you're already failing to control and stop this nonsense.

PS: When asked, Dear Citizen, you are entitled to suggest your own ethnic origin. In view of the oppression being suffered by that peaceful nation, may I suggest that we all register as ethnic Tibetan. Although, I think I may later choose to register as an Iraqi Jew.

'legislation by stealth'

You Have To Laugh. Or Something.

20 January 2008 .

They're falling over themselves to admit to missing and stolen data... laptops, today, pushed by the RN chap leaving his laptop in the car to be stolen the other day:

• Ministry of Defence, over the past five years: 420 laptops reported stolen.
• All departments, last year: 208 laptops gone.

The MoD's defence is that this has to be seen in the context of a department employing 300,000 people. So don't collect, keep and propagate all this information, then.

Well, we assume that they're falling over themselves... although so much data material has gone astray now that it hardly seems to matter whether there's anything more to discover. If you're British, it's now overwhelmingly likely that information about you has passed into the wrong hands.

Alan Beith, chair of the House of Commons Justice Committee: 'People are extraordinarily blasé. The procedures are hopelessly lax.'

One thing I'm certain of: by choice, I'd have no part of an ID scheme - I'd go to nick rather than volunteer any more of my details to this mob. But of course, they'll do it by the back door - data collection before I can have a passport, or see a doctor, or send my kid to school, or travel on public transport. Not to put too fine a point on it, we're all s****d.

What I still don't understand is my friends who say, 'I don't mind what the government knows - I've got nothing to hide.' Talk about cattle asking to be branded - even if there weren't a virtual 100% likelihood of their details going AWOL.

'Ministry of Defense' 'Alan Beith' 'Commons Justice Committee' 'stolen laptops'

More Data Loss. Nothing To Worry About.

19 January 2008 .

Several postbags full of confidential (sic) and intimate data kept by the Dept of Work and Pensions on vast numbers of claimants (presumably among the most vulnerable in society) dumped on a roundabout in Exeter: the same thing for the second time in a few months on the same roundabout; how does that happen? (And those are just the bags that have been recovered.)

A laptop left in a car overnight by an RN petty officer containing anything including bank details, national insurance numbers, etc, of 600,000 members, recruits and applicants for the RN, Marines and RAF. Left in a car! And stolen. A gift, apparently, for terrorists (sorry, 'people committing anti-Islamic activities' - this from Jacqui Smith: trying to see 'terrorism' through a new prism may be timely and welcome, but I don't suppose this particular nomenclature will really take off). A gift in more than one sense.

Both these since last year's data-loss scandals.

Ye gods.

'Department of Work and Pensions' 'Roundabout in Exeter'

Promiscuous Data-Management.

13 December 2007 .

It's a couple of weeks since the lost CDs crisis went public, and some of the dust has had time to settle.

It's clear that electronic data storage is here to stay; it would be ridiculous to expect the government or anyone else to return to paper storage - apart from being intolerably expensive, it would mean it would take forever to deal with the simplest query.

The point is not that the government should stop keeping electronic data on us but:

1) The nature of data that is kept on us should be justified to the people, transparent to the people, and realistically open to challenge by the people. Two out of three of those are not true, for example, of the DNA database held by the police on witnesses, innocent persons and children. Likewise the data-harvesting under the proposed arrangements for travellers.

2) Because the government has failed to demonstrate any restraint, in the eyes of a substantial chunk of the public, in the range of data it accumulates, there has to be external supervision with at least judicial authority.

3) Before even considering gathering new info (travel, ID cards etc.), the government must get its act together on the security of the data it already holds - something which so far it has lamentably, demonstrably, repeatedly and disastrously failed to do. Since the government does not yet have the expertise required for this, and since their response to disasters is invariably 'new measures are now in place', which equally invariably prove to be inadequate, there has to be independently powerful external supervision here too.

The executive believes that, with its small coterie of (largely private) outside agencies and contractors, it has expertise in an enormous range of human activities; but the evidence does not entirely support this confidence. Education, health, transport and war-making are only some of the areas where competence has not been proven. Just like IT. In fact, I believe that the most usual occupation found in MPs is that of lawyer; yet the government does not even have a good recent record on framing laws, hence the extent to which they have to keep rewriting, amending and adjusting them. Their failures in all these fields damage and too often destroy lives: the silver lining in the CDs fiasco was that, with 25 million people affected at once, there is at last (still, just) a chance that people will sit up and take notice.

Incidentally: it would never occur to me not give my DNA sample to assist the police - if I hadn't come to feel that my details would be kept forever whether I agreed or not.

'Data harvesting' 'data on travellers'

"A Serious Renewed Debate" on ID Cards

09 December 2007 .

The public, far from resisting Big Brother-style surveillance, are largely happy to share their personal information through social networking websites, supermarket loyalty cards, public transport swipe-cards and CCTV cameras. So say researchers from Demos.

They are calling for more debate, however, because people are gradually becoming uneasy about the consequences of losing control of their personal data.

Just a squeak of protest from your correspondent about (both of ) the observations:

I happen to be interested in the debates about the relationship between government and governed (and between corporation and customer); there's no reason why I should expect everyone else to have the same interest. However, my interest does mean that I am very definitely not happy about sharing my personal information in the ways mentioned. Arrogantly, perhaps... I wonder if the research might have been more meaningful if it had assessed the degree of understanding of what data-harvesting implies among the people who 'are largely happy'.

As for the second paragraph: people are not becoming more uneasy (and therefore, hopefully, careful) because the government, or other data-harvesters, have made any effort to educate us. In fact, the government's funds, so far as I can see, are largely spent in trying to convince us how wonderful it will all be. People are learning - because the systems don't work, and probably never will, and the cracks are showing.

We each appear on about 700 databases, apparently. But it's okay; you may have to pay a small charge for each one you check, but you are allowed to check (most of them) for accuracy. And you're entitled to hope that all those people are trustworthy. By the way, do you know which 700 you're on?

Demos 'loyalty cards' 'swipe cards' 'personal data'

Blunkett: Robespierre is Alive and Well.

23 November 2007 .

A letter in the Times from Blunkett today ("Security needs more data, not less", Nov 23). His response to the ID crisis was so revealing of himself that I suggest it's worth reading.

On the other hand, I have just submitted my first ever hope of a letter in that quondam august journal, the which is here; it may just negate the need to read his:

If there is something about Robespierre to Mr. Blunkett, by which I intend both compliment and criticism, but no insult, it was surely apparent today ("Security needs more data, not less", Nov 23).

In arguing for ID cards, Mr. Blunkett seeks a rational solution to a rationally perceived problem, but he is so convinced that his is the best way forward that he is certain that those who disagree with him do so from knavery ('a diversion by those who never wanted ID cards anyway') or foolishness ('that so few people understand this...') He himself fails to understand that, human nature being the way it is, the most rational route may not be the most acceptable; and that suspicion of an over-controlling government plays an important part in maintaining the dignity of the individual.

The parallel is drawn even clearer in the failure of both men to grasp that their dream turned, for too many people, into a nightmare.

Whether it deserves a slot on the basis of literary merit or interest, I cannot say: I don't read Murdoch often so I don't know if it conforms to his line, and anyway it may already have been said.

Blunkett Robespierre 'Security needs more data, not less'

Comments Received: Most People Just Forget:

23 November 2007 .

I believe, and wrote yesterday (below), that the loss the two discs of data by the treasury will come as a wake-up call. I seem to be alone in thinking this; the consensus here is that people will just forget, unless their bank accounts are invaded.

I hope I'm right. If I'm not, I'll consider emigration.

It may that every electorate in the world is just as sheep-like. Well, so be it: if I have to live in a disconnected and self-destructive society, I'd rather it were someone else's

'data loss' 'bank accounts' treasury security

By the way... (re the missing discs)

22 November 2007 .

Why were intimate details held by the government (at its insistence) on 15 million children given, unsecured, to a private sector company as a matter of routine?


Letters to an Editor:

22 November 2007 .

Sometimes, in exasperation, I write a Letter To The Editor, usually of the Independent. Sometimes my letter gets printed. I hope I write because I have something to say, but I admit I get a kick out of seeing my name in print. [I flatter myself that the Indy does not print our letters just to massage our egos.] Please forgive my vanity if I reprint today's effort here: I regret that it was one of the less thought-provoking of the letters, but I think it makes its point.

Sir,

While I hope that information about me, my friends and relatives has not been disseminated, I nevertheless in part welcome the recent loss of so much data. With any luck at all it will vaccinate us against allowing our state to continue its Orwellian momentum.

Imagine that this same event had happened in five years' time. The loss of data now is minimal by comparison.

In passing: I have had confidential information about me escape at least twice in the past. Each time I have been told that it couldn't happen again - more modern systems were now in place. Please, do not fall for that particular line

Faithfully, etc.

Notes:

In the 80's I was teaching in a comprehensive.

1) The first time info escaped ran thus: some of my students were doing their work experience in a London teaching hospital where I had recently been treated. They were left to entertain themselves on a computer: naturally enough they looked up records, and found mine. Since I felt at the time that no harm had been done, I complied when the school asked me not to pursue the matter. If I had only known...

2) A year or two later, I went for a routine eye-test to an occulist. Unknown to me, the receptionist was the mother of one of my students. My previous test had been done by the Air Force. My past was no particular secret, but there was no reason why any student should be told about my life away from school (or should not be told - but by me if I happened to mention it). The first I knew of an escape of info was when the student announced in class that he knew I'd been in uniform. His mother had told him.

3) Later, in the 90s: The DVLA denied it, but I received commercial mail, including junk mail, including details which seemed to come from DVLA. Along time later, I heard by chance that DVLA had been selling database material in bulk to commercial organisations. To this day I don't know anything for sure, and certainly cannot prove anything.

4) A friend told me that she had seen my signature somewhere on the web. Unfortunately, she omitted to record where, and I couldn't find it; so she may have been simply feeding my paranoia.

The problem with writing to the Editor is that publication is then in the lap of the gods. Even if no-one were to visit my site, at least my grumbles would be out there in cyberspace.

Incidentally, when I mentioned to my cousin once that I had had a letter printed, he gave me a very funny look and said, "Ah, you're a letter writer, are you?"

DVLA 'data loss' 'medical records' 'computers and work experience'

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